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Is_Our_Money_Safe_-_Part_I
| Is Our Money Safe? - Part I
Banks are institutions where miracles happen regularly. We
rarely entrust our money to anyone but ourselves – and our
banks. Despite a very chequered history of mismanagement,
corruption, false promises and representations, delusions and
behavioural inconsistency – banks still succeed to motivate us
to give them our money. Partly it is the feeling that there is
safety in numbers. The fashionable term today is "moral hazard".
The implicit guarantees of the state and of other financial
institutions move us to take risks which we would, otherwise,
have avoided. Partly it is the sophistication of the banks in
marketing and promoting themselves and their products. Glossy
brochures, professional computer and video presentations and
vast, shrine-like, real estate complexes all serve to enhance
the image of the banks as the temples of the new religion of
money.
But what is behind all this? How can we judge the soundness of
our banks? In other words, how can we tell if our money is
safely tucked away in a safe haven?
The reflex is to go to the bank's balance sheets. Banks and
balance sheets have been both invented in their modern form in
the 15th century. A balance sheet, coupled with other financial
statements is supposed to provide us with a true and full
picture of the health of the bank, its past and its long-term
prospects. The surprising thing is that – despite common opinion
– it does.
But it is rather useless unless you know how to read it.
Financial statements (Income – or Profit and Loss - Statement,
Cash Flow Statement and Balance Sheet) come in many forms.
Sometimes they conform to Western accounting standards (the
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, GAAP, or the less
rigorous and more fuzzily worded International Accounting
Standards, IAS). Otherwise, they conform to local accounting
standards, which often leave a lot to be desired. Still, you
should look for banks, which make their updated financial
reports available to you. The best choice would be a bank that
is audited by one of the Big Four Western accounting firms and
makes its audit reports publicly available. Such audited
financial statements should consolidate the financial results of
the bank with the financial results of its subsidiaries or
associated companies. A lot often hides in those corners of
corporate holdings.
Banks are rated by independent agencies. The most famous and
most reliable of the lot is Fitch Ratings. Another one is
Moody’s. These agencies assign letter and number combinations to
the banks that reflect their stability. Most agencies
differentiate the short term from the long term prospects of the
banking institution rated. Some of them even study (and rate)
issues, such as the legality of the operations of the bank
(legal rating). Ostensibly, all a concerned person has to do,
therefore, is to step up to the bank manager, muster courage and
ask for the bank's rating. Unfortunately, life is more
complicated than rating agencies would have us believe.
They base themselves mostly on the financial results of the bank
rated as a reliable gauge of its financial strength or financial
profile. Nothing is further from the truth.
Admittedly, the financial results do contain a few important
facts. But one has to look beyond the naked figures to get the
real – often much less encouraging – picture.
Consider the thorny issue of exchange rates. Financial
statements are calculated (sometimes stated in USD in addition
to the local currency) using the exchange rate prevailing on the
31st of December of the fiscal year (to which the statements
refer). In a country with a volatile domestic currency this
would tend to completely distort the true picture. This is
especially true if a big chunk of the activity preceded this
arbitrary date. The same applies to financial statements, which
were not inflation-adjusted in high inflation countries. The
statements will look inflated and even reflect profits where
heavy losses were incurred. "Average amounts" accounting (which
makes use of average exchange rates throughout the year) is even
more misleading. The only way to truly reflect reality is if the
bank were to keep two sets of accounts: one in the local
currency and one in USD (or in some other currency of
reference). Otherwise, fictitious growth in the asset base (due
to inflation or currency fluctuations) could result.
Another example: in many countries, changes in regulations can
greatly effect the financial statements of a bank. In 1996, in
Russia, for example, the Bank of Russia changed the algorithm
for calculating an important banking ratio (the capital to risk
weighted assets ratio).
Unless a Russian bank restated its previous financial statements
accordingly, a sharp change in profitability appeared from
nowhere.
The net assets themselves are always misstated: the figure
refers to the situation on 31/12. A 48-hour loan given to a
collaborating client can inflate the asset base on the crucial
date. This misrepresentation is only mildly ameliorated by the
introduction of an "average assets" calculus. Moreover, some of
the assets can be interest earning and performing – others,
non-performing. The maturity distribution of the assets is also
of prime importance. If most of the bank's assets can be
withdrawn by its clients on a very short notice (on demand) – it
can swiftly find itself in trouble with a run on its assets
leading to insolvency.
Another oft-used figure is the net income of the bank. It is
important to distinguish interest income from non-interest
income. In an open, sophisticated credit market, the income from
interest differentials should be minimal and reflect the risk
plus a reasonable component of income to the bank. But in many
countries (Japan, Russia) the government subsidizes banks by
lending to them money cheaply (through the Central Bank or
through bonds). The banks then proceed to lend the cheap funds
at exorbitant rates to their customers, thus reaping enormous
interest income. In many countries the income from government
securities is tax free, which represents another form of
subsidy. A high income from interest is a sign of weakness, not
of health, here today, gone tomorrow. The preferred indicator
should be income from operations (fees, commissions and other
charges).
There are a few key ratios to observe. A relevant question is
whether the bank is accredited with international banking
agencies. These issue regulatory capital requirements and other
mandatory ratios. Compliance with these demands is a minimum in
the absence of which, the bank should be regarded as positively
dangerous.
(continued)
About the author:
Sam Vaknin is the author of Malignant Self Love - Narcissism
Revisited and After the Rain - How the West Lost the East. He is
a columnist for Central Europe Review, United Press
International (UPI) and eBookWeb and the editor of mental health
and Central East Europe categories in The Open Directory and
Suite101.
Web site:
http://samvak.tripod.com/
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